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NOTES

Does a Copyright Coowner's Duty To Account Arise
Under Federal Law?
Craig Y. Allison
A difficult question arises when a copyright coowner exploits a
copyright without the consent of the other owners. The other owners
cannot sue him for copyright infringement, the only cause of action
explicitly created by the Copyright Act of 1976, because an owner cannot infringe on his own work. 1 For decades, however, the courts have
provided a remedy by imposing a duty on the coowner to account to
the other owners for the profits reaped from copyright. 2 Although
both state and federal courts have imposed this duty to account, the
question remains whether it derives from state or federal law.
Joint ownership cases may be divided into two categories. In joint
authorship cases, the dispute concerns whether the plaintiff contributed sufficiently to a work to be considered a coauthor. In contract
cases, the plaintiff claims ownership by virtue of an assignment from
the original author. The answer to the question whether the duty to
account arises from state or federal law may differ depending on how a
dispute is categorized because state and federal interests differ in these
two classes of cases.
A clear answer to this question is necessary for several reasons.
Plaintiffs need to be certain which forum bas jurisdiction over their
claim. Because federal courts have exclusive federal jurisdiction over
copyright law, 3 plaintiffs who bring suit in the wrong forum will have
their complaints dismissed, causing additional expense and delay.
Furthermore, claims of joint authorship are likely to arise with increasing frequency because recent interpretation of the work-for-hire
doctrine restricts copyright protection for employers.4 Thus, copyright plaintiffs are now likely to bring joint ownership claims with sufficient frequency to require resolution of the jurisdictional question.
This Note discusses both the source of the accounting rule and the
1. See 17 u.s.c. § 501-10 (1988) (chapter on remedies); 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT§ 4.03(B][4] (1991); 1 MELVIN D. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
CoPYRIGHT § 6.10, at 6-26 (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER].
2. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (the federal copyright jurisdiction statute).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748-50 (1989) (judicial construction of the § 101 definition); infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text.
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proper forum for applying the rule. Part I provides a general history
of joint ownership and the duty to account and suggests that the
number of litigants presenting joint ownership claims will probably
increase. Part II discusses joint ownership case law chronologically.
This Part shows that the case law is consistent with the view that the
duty to account was a creation of the federal courts. Part III argues
that the accounting rule is federal common law and that federal jurisdiction necessarily follows for all copyright accounting cases. But
even if the courts hold that the duty to account is state law, this Part
argues that jurisdiction does not always lie in the state courts. Federal
courts should exercise jurisdiction over actions in which the plaintiff
pleads copyright ownership by virtue of joint authorship.

I.

HISTORY OF THE JOINT OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY

This Part examines the history of joint copyright ownership. Section I.A discusses the evolution of joint copyright ownership, which
culminated with the recognition of the duty to account. Section I.B
describes how the Copyright Act of 1976 and later judicial interpretations of that Act have combined to increase the likelihood of joint
ownership disputes. With greater numbers of disputes, the courts will
need to resolve the jurisdictional questions over the duty to account.
A. Historical Background of Joint Ownership and the Duty To
Account
The controversy over the source of the duty to account can best be
understood by looking at the historical development of the law of joint
ownership. Until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,5 the
courts created and developed the law of joint ownership. 6 In many
respects, the joint ownership provisions in the 1976 Act merely codify
this judge-made law. 7 Thus, uncertainty in the present federal statute
arises directly from uncertainty in the previous case law. This section
discusses the development of the joint ownership case law.
The courts had at least three choices from which to fashion the
rules governing copyright coowners. The simplest is to allow each
coowner to exploit the work freely with no duty to account. This was
the earliest rule, set forth in Carter v. Bailey, 8 which held that an
owner could reproduce and sell a jointly authored book without the
consent of the other owner and without accounting for the profits.
5. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-810 (1988).
6. For example, joint work is undefined in the Copyright Act of 1909, the predecessor of the
1976 Act. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; 1 ABRAMS, supra note l, § 4.03[A][2].
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 104 (1975); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
8. 64 Me. 458, 463-64 (1874).
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This rule, which was consonant with the patent laws, 9 may have led to
wider publication of already-existing works, because one owner was
not able to veto another owner's exploitation of a work. 10 Later courts
rejected the Carter rule, however, on the ground that exploitation by
one owner may effectively destroy the residual value of the copyright
to the other owners. 11 Commentators also pointed out that the rule
may lead to a race between joint owners to exploit a work and thus a
waste of the value of the copyright.12
A second rule, the English rule, provides that no coowner may
exploit his interest in a copyright without the consent of all coowners.13 This rule thwarts the owners' race to exploit by preventing such
exploitation until all owners agree to an equitable distribution of the
profits. But the English rule may impede publication of a joint work
because a would-be copyright licensee may be unable to obtain the
consent of all coowners. I4
American courts have rejected the Carter rule and have universally
settled on a third position: A coowner may exploit a joint work without the other owners' consent but must account to the other owners
for all resulting profits. Is Like the English rule, the accounting rule
prevents any owner from depleting the value of the copyright at the
expense of the other owners. It also deters a destructive race among
owners to exploit the copyright. 16 By allowing independent exploitation by each owner, the accounting rule impedes publication less than
the English rule. Furthermore, the accounting rule avoids the unfairness that sometimes results under the Carter rule. An unsophisticated
coauthor who made no contractual provision for sharing the profits
would be able to recover under the accounting rule, but not under
Carter v. Bailey. Such considerations of fairness have caused some
courts to justify the duty to account on the ground of a constructive
9. Joint owners of a patent have no duty to account to one another. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1988).

10. Note, Accountability Among Co-Owners ofStatutory Copyright, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1550,
1556 (1959). This rule would provide no incentive to the creation of new joint works, however,
and might even discourage their creation, since each author might expect to lose income from the
independent exploitation of other authors.
11. See Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Miller Music, 74 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947).
12. 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A], at 6-28. Waste may occur when two coowners compete to sell rights in a work to the same licensor, who may play one owner against the other to
purchase the rights at well below market value. The court implied that this happened in Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
13. See Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879); Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.,
[1916] 2 K.B. 325; Note, supra note 10, at 1558.
14. See Note, supra note 10, at 1558.
15. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (12th Street
Rag); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (My
Melancholy Baby); 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.12[A].
16. See Note, supra note 10, at 1559.
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trust between joint copyright owners. 17
The Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated the accounting rule without modification. 18 The Act itself only briefly addresses the issue. The
1976 Act defines joint work as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 19 The Act's only
explicit mention of coownership provides that such joint authors are
"coowners of copyright in the work." 20 The Committee Reports explain the brevity of these provisions as follows:
There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the
rights and duties of coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is
left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a
copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each
coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work,
subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.21

Thus, the present state of the accounting rule under the 1976 Act is
found in the case law that fashioned the rule.
B. Increasing Importance of Joint Ownership and the Duty To
Account

Although the duty to account changed little with the enactment of
the Copyright Act of 1976, the 1976 Act substantially changed previous doctrine on work for hire. 22 This section explores how receµt
Supreme Court interpretation23 of the work-for-hire provisions of the
1976 Act may increase the number of litigants claiming joint ownership of copyright. Such an increase demands that the courts resolve
the jurisdictional issue concerning the duty to account.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal copyright issues makes a
clear choice of forum especially important in copyright accounting
cases. State courts normally have concurrent jurisdiction over federal
questions. 24 Exclusive federal jurisdiction,25 however, means that a
state court must dismiss the complaint of a plaintiff who erroneously
brings a copyright action in state court. On the other hand, courts
17. See e.g., Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1915); 1 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 6.12[A], at 6-27.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 104 (1975).
19. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 20l(a) (1988).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 104 (1975).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire).
23. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
24. Grubb v. Public Utils. Commn., 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988) (defining federal question jurisdiction).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) ("Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in ... copyright cases.").
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have traditionally considered many of the disputes over transfer of
copyright ownership to be state contract questions. 26 The federal
courts have jurisdiction only over contract disputes that satisfy the
requirements of diversity or supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss
claims if incorrectly brought in federal court.27 The plaintiff must
therefore make the correct choice of forum or suffer dismissal. 28 This
problem of battling exclusivities occurs only in the few areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction,29 and it can cause substantial hardship if, as
in the case of joint ownership and the duty to account, the proper
forum is unclear.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, copyright initially vested in the
employer in the case of a work made for hire. 30 The 1909 Act left to
the courts the task of defining the terms employer and works made for
hire. 31 Courts eventually concluded that a work was made for hire
when the employer had the right to control or supervise the creation of
the work; 32 the employer did not have to participate in or have actual
control over its creation. 33 This "right to control" standard presumed
that a person who hired either an independent contractor or a traditional employee to produce a work was the statutory author and thus
the copyright owner. 34
The Copyright Act of 1976 and its interpretation in Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 35 radically curtailed the work-forhire doctrine. The 1976 Act limits works made for hire to two types:
first, works prepared by employees, and second, certain categories of
works prepared by independent contractors. 36 A work created by an
independent contractor qualifies as a work made for hire only if it falls
under one of nine categories enumerated in the definition, and only if
the parties expressly agree in writing to consider it a work made for
26. See 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS·
DICTION AND RELATED MATI'ERS § 3582, at 310-13 (2d ed. 1984).
27. See id. at 313.
28. See, e.g., Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co., 368 S.E.2d 466 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff's
breach of contract suit over a copyright was dismissed when the state court held that construe·
tion of the copyright statute was required).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988) (federal crimes); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (bankruptcy);
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (patent and copyright cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988) (actions against
consuls and vice consuls).
30. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, sec. 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88.
31. Matthew R. Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made for Hire, 89
MICH. L. REV. 661, 670 (1990).
32. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03(B][l][a]; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123
F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
33. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03(B][l][a].
34. See Harris, supra note 31, at 671-73.
35. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire).
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hire. 37 This provision changes previous law considerably, giving the
independent contractor, rather than the hiring party, the initial copyright in a work unless the work falls under one of the exceptions.
Some courts resisted this interpretation for several years, 38 even
though a plain reading of the statute supports it.39 Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 40 ended the controversy by holding that
the principles of the general common law of agency4 1 determine
whether a creator is an employee or an independent contractor.42 If
the creator is an independent contractor and the work does not fall
under one of the nine enumerated categories, the copyright initially
vests with the creator.43
Reid will likely increase litigation under the definition ofjoint work
in the 1976 Act. 44 Before Reid, joint authorship problems seldom
arose because the copyright almost inevitably vested in the hiring
party. But now that copyright will more often initially vest with creators, questions involving the scope of each author's contribution to
the work and the authors' intentions to create a joint work will necessarily arise. For example, independent contractors may dispute copyright ownership with their employers.45 Or the actual creators of a
work may dispute copyright ownership among themselves. These new
joint authorship disputes will often produce concomitant demands for
an accounting, putting greater pressure on courts to decide whether
the duty to account is state or federal law. 46
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). These categories include works that are commissioned
for use [1] as a contribution to a collective work, [2] as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, [3] as a translation, [4] as a supplementary work, [5] as a compilation, [6]
as an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer material for a test, or [9] as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
38. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
982 (1984) (actual control by the hiring party held to make creator an employee, not an independent contractor); Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (right
to control by hiring party held to make creator an employee).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of work made for hire).
40. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
41. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 220 (1957) (definition of a servant).
42. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
43. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
44. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988).
45. Reid itself is an example of an employer-independent contractor dispute and of the increased importance of joint authorship under the 1976 Act. In Reid, a sculptor was hired to
create a statue as part of a larger work being built by the hiring party. Under the 1909 Act, the
copyright to the sculpture would have automatically vested in the hiring party. But here the
Supreme Court held that the sculptor was an independent contractor and thus had the initial
copyright to his sculpture. The Court left open, probably for further litigation, the possibility
that the combined work could be considered a joint work. 490 U.S. at 753.
46. But see 1 ABRAMS, supra note l, § 4.02[C][l][a][i] (claiming that the Restatement definition of employee is nothing more than a "right to control" standard, similar to that prevailing
before the enactment of the 1976 Act; thus, the rights of independent contractors are not expanded under Reid).
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Because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in copyright
cases,47 this increase in cases may create practical problems. For example, if a plaintiff commissions and closely directs the creation of a
work by an independent contractor and then brings suit against the
contractor, the plaintiff has two possible claims: sole or joint authorship. He may claim infringement based on sole authorship, arguing
that he is the author "in the same way a poet is author of a poem that
she dictates to a stenographer."48 He may also have the option of
claiming sole authorship and infringement under the work-for-hire
doctrine, arguing that the work falls under one of the nine enumerated
categories of section 101(2) of the 1976 Act. In either case, the action
must be pursued in federal courts against the independent contractor.
Alternatively, the plaintiff may base his claim on joint authorship
in the work by virtue of his contribution to the creation.49 As a joint
author, he would have to sue for an accounting, not for infringement.
If the plaintiff brings the action in federal court, he runs the risk of
dismissal if the court disallows the infringement count; if he proceeds
in state court, the same fate may await him if the court holds that the
accounting rule is an exclusively federal action. 50
The jurisdictional issue is not the only question concerning duty to
account that the courts will have to resolve as these cases arise with
increasing frequency. The courts must also decide how to apportion
profits among coauthors. In Reid, the D.C. Circuit ruled that anyone
who contributes more than a de minimis amount to the work is a coauthor51 and receives an equal share of the profits, "even where it is
clear that [the] respective contributions to the work are not equal." 52
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988); see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
48. Marci A. Hamilton, Note, Commissioned Works as Works Made/or Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1303 & n.118 (1987),
cited in 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03[B] n.84; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1491 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Henry Moore, for example, engaging others
to execute his fine art"), affd., 490 U.S. 730 (1989). Such claims of sole authorship have often
prevailed. See, e.g., Gallery House, Inc. v. Li, 582 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (plaintiff, who
had given detailed sketches of statues to defendant moldmakers, was held to be sole author of
statues produced by defendants); M.S.R. Imports, Inc. v. R.E. Greenspan Co., 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 361 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff, who directed defendant artists to put a Coke logo on the
side of a wagon design in the public domain, held to be sole author).
49. See, e.g., Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497 (a statue sculpted by Reid, whose work was generally
directed by CCNV, coupled with a pedestal for the statue built by CCNV, "might qualify as a
textbook example of a jointly authored work ....").
50. Federal jurisdiction will be exclusive if the court finds jurisdiction under the copyright
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
51. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496. The Supreme Court opinion shed no further light on the
copyrightability standard; it merely cited the statutory definition of joint work, 11 U.S.C § 101.
490 U.S. at 735.
52. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1498, quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.08, at 6-20. The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled that "joint authorship requires each author to make an
independently copyrightable contribution." Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th
Cir. 1990); see Norbert F. Kugele, Note, How Much Does It Take?: Copyrightability as a Mini·
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This rule leads to equitable results only when a small number of joint
authors contribute roughly equally to a work. When persons making
varying contributions to a work all claim joint author status, however,
the proceeds from the work will be distributed unfairly. As fewer employers automatically obtain sole ownership of copyright, such fact
patterns may occur with greater frequency.
This apportionment of profits among joint owners is not a jurisdictional issue, but its resolution depends on the source of the duty to
account. If courts determine that the duty to account is federal law,
federal courts will have a greater hand in fashioning the law that apportions the profits among joint owners. Thus, deciding whether the
accounting rule is of state or federal origin will shape the evolution of
the rule.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE OVER WHETHER THE DUTY
ACCOUNT Is A STATE OR A FEDERAL QUESTION

To

This Part outlines the case law relevant to a copyright coowner's
duty to account to other owners. These decisions show that the duty
to account arose in its modem form almost entirely by means of federal court decisions. The origination of the accounting rule in the federal courts supports the claim that the accounting rule is a federal
common law remedy.
Three overlapping stages in the case law define the development of
the jurisdictional question. Section II.A discusses the period beginning in the early part of the century, but developing mostly in the
1940s and 1950s, in which courts created the duty of a coowner to
account to other joint owners of a copyright. The decisions of this era,
rendered almost entirely by the federal courts, never explicitly mentioned the jurisdictional question. Section II.B discusses the next line
of case law, which began in the late 1950s and continues to the present. These courts have held that the duty to account is a state common law remedy. Most have held that only infringement can be
litigated under federal law, and that an action to determine title alone,
the crux of most accounting cases, is not a federal question. Barring
diversity jurisdiction or pendent jurisdiction arising from other federal
claims, these courts have dismissed cases concerning the duty to account. Finally, section II.C discusses two cases from the 1980s holding that at least some disputes over the duty to account involve the
application and interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions
of the 1976 Act and so are properly federal questions.
mum Standard for Determining Joint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 809 (discussion of the
circuit split regarding the copyrightability standard).
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A. Early Cases
The earliest American cases dealing with joint ownership of copyright and the duty to account were actually state, not federal, cases.
These decisions, however, held that a coowner had no duty to account
for profits, and thus they cannot be considered the source of the modem accounting rule. These courts apparently derived jurisdiction
from the assumption that joint ownership of copyright was identical to
common law tenancy-in-common and was hence a state law matter.
The first American case dealing with joint ownership and the duty
to account, Carter v. Bailey, 53 involved the reproduction of a copyrighted book by one owner without the consent of the other owner.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the defendant could
reproduce the book without consent and with no duty to account for
the profits. In another early state court case, Nillson v. Lawrence, 54
the court held that coowners of a play could exploit the play without
the consent of other coowners and refused to award the plaintiff either
an injunction stopping the production of the play or an accounting for
profits. Neither of these state courts explicitly mentioned the jurisdictional question. Both apparently considered the coowners to be tenants in common and applied common law property rules. 55
The federal courts originated the modem duty to account after the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909. 56 The 1909 Act failed to
address many copyright problems, 57 including the problems of joint
ownership. To fill these gaps, the federal courts, especially the Second
Circuit, played an increasing role in adapting the language of the statute to the needs of the modem publishing and communication
industries.
The federal courts' attempts to fashion the rights and remedies of
copyright coowners began in 1915 with Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in Maurel v. Smith. 58 Maurel contains the first judicial recognition of
the duty to account. 59 The plaintiff, an author of a comic opera,
brought suit against her coauthors, who had taken out a copyright in
their names only and entered into a licensing agreement with a publisher. The court held that the defendants held the copyright in a con53. 64 Me. 458 (1874).
54. 133 N.Y.S. 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
55. 133 N.Y.S. at 295. For a short survey of common law tenancy in common as it relates to
copyright, see Note, supra note 10, at 1554-55.
56. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
57. For example, such important terms as employer and work made/or hire were left unde·
fined. See Harris, supra note 31, at 670. Congress tried unsuccessfully several times between
1924 and 1974 to rewrite the 1909 Act. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1987).
58. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), ajfd., 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
59. See Vern G. Davidson, Comment, Problems in Co-ownership of Copyrights, 8 UCLA L.
REV. 1035, 1040-41 (1961).
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structive trust for the plaintiff, and so were "accountable to the
plaintiff [to] share and share alike" the royalties from the license. 60
The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the court's jurisdiction, but
only on the basis that the amount in controversy did not reach the
minimum of $3000 then required for federal jurisdiction.61 The silence of the record implies that federal jurisdiction over the dispute
was otherwise uncontroversial. 62 The federal courts reaffirmed the accounting rule of Maurel v. Smith in several decisions beginning in the
1940s. 63 By this time, the federal cases acknowledged the two bases
for the duty to account: the theory of a constructive trust between
coowners and the theory of depletion or destruction of the copyright
by one coowner. 64
State cases recognizing the duty to account, on the other hand,
came later than these early federal cases and relied on them as precedent. The leading state case, Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Miller Music, 65
relied entirely on federal precedent66 to reject the holding of Carter v.
Bailey. 61 Brown v. Republic Productions, 68 adjudicated by the Califor60. Maurel, 220 F. at 201.
61. Maurel, 220 F. at 202. The $3000 amount-in-controversy requirement leads to a puzzle
over jurisdiction. The court must have taken jurisdiction based on either a federal question or
diversity, both of which had a $3000 amount-in-controversy requirement in 1915. 13B WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 26, § 3561.1, at 5. The court apparently did not base jurisdiction on the
copyright jurisdiction statute, which has never had an amount-in-controversy requirement. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. (pt. 1) 1087, 1091-92 ($3000 requirement for diversity
and federal question jurisdiction; no amount in controversy required for copyright cases). If the
court relied on diversity jurisdiction, it may have created the accounting rule under the federal
general common law, rather than state law, since the decision took place before Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (invalidating fedecil general common law).
62. See also Klein v. Beach, 232 F. 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), ajfd., 239 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1917)
("Here both Beach and Klein became the owners of Klein's drama, and each could then do with
it what he pleased, with the duty of accounting over.").
63. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (applying
accounting rule in copyright dispute over the musical work 12th Street Rag), modified, 223 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1947) (applying accounting rule to song My Melancholy Baby); Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Wonnell, 61 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (finding parties to be coowners of song
and therefore entitled to share equally in royalties); Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., 52 F. Supp.
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (acknowledging rights of coowners to an accounting of profits from motion
picture rights to a play); see also Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co, 140
F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944) (in a suit involving an injunction, rather than an accounting, the renewal
of the copyright by one joint owner made him a constructive trustee for the other coowners). See
generally Davidson, supra note 59, at 1040-44 (general discussion of early accounting cases).
These decisions occurred after Erie, so they cannot be examples of federal general common law.
See supra note 61.
64. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
65. 74 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947), ajfd., 87 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1949).
66. 74 N.Y.S.2d at 427. The court cited Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,
73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (My Melancholy Baby), as well as other federal precedent discussed above.
67. 64 Me. 458 (1874); see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
.
68. 156 P.2d 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), ajfd., 161 P.2d 796 (1945); Brown v. Republic Prods.,
156 P.2d 42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), ajfd., 161 P.2d 798 (1945) (companion case).
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nia state courts in 1945, acknowledged an author's duty to account to
his coauthors for the profits from licensing a song. 69 Unlike the previous cases, however, the Brown cases unquestionably triggered state jurisdiction because the songs at issue were unpublished and thus
protected only by state common law, not federal statutory,
copyright. 70
In summary, the federal cases originated the accounting rule after
it had been rejected by early state court cases. The federal courts,
which made no explicit mention of the jurisdictional question, seemed
to have taken federal jurisdiction as a given. 71 State courts began to
enforce the duty to account only after the federal courts had settled
the scope of the duty.

Cases Denying Federal Jurisdiction over the Duty To Account
A line of cases beginning in the late 1950s holds that claims involving the duty to account do not give rise to federal jurisdiction.72 The
duty to account rarely arises in isolation; it flows from a title dispute
among copyright owners over either a contractual assignment of the
copyright or joint authorship. 73 For either contract or joint authorship cases, this line of authority considers the adjudication of a copyright title dispute and the concomitant duty to account to be
exclusively a state court matter. 74
Some cases decided in the Second Circuit have taken the position
that federal jurisdiction is only proper when the complaint alleges
copyright infringement. These courts consider any other copyright
cause of action, including the duty to account, to be based on state
law. Harrington v. Mure, 75 a joint authorship case, illustrates this position. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was a coowner of a
copyright, for an assignment of his share of the copyright, and for an
accounting for the profits. 76 The court held that,
B.

69. 156 P.2d at 41.
70. The 1976 Act completely preempts common law copyright, thus eliminating the role of
the states in protecting these rights in unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988).
71. None of the cases makes clear whether the federal courts were relying on diversity juris·
diction or federal question or copyright jurisdiction. See supra note 61. The absence of any
language explaining federal jurisdiction in most of these cases indicates that the courts did not
address the question at all. The most likely explanation is that the courts had simply not thought
through the jurisdictional question, perhaps because no party raised it.
72. See, e.g., Gorham v. Edwards, 164 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (early dispute over
agreement for exclusive rights to a song in which court held that the suit for an injunction and an
accounting arose " 'out of the contract, and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and
the federal courts are without jurisdiction'") (quoting Danks v. Gordon, 272 F.2d 821, 827 (2d
Cir. 1921)).
73. See cases cited supra section II.A.
74. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-14.
75. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (plaintiff alleged that he coauthored a musical com po·
sition with the defendants).
76. 186 F. Supp. at 656.
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[a]bsent a basis for a claim of infringement, a case presenting a claim of
equitable ownership with a prayer for an assignment and an accounting
does not "arise under the Copyright Law." ... The sources of the obligations to assign and to account are equitable doctrines relating to unjust
enrichment and general principles oflaw governing the rights of co-owners, not remedial provisions of the Copyright Law. 7 7

Other cases extended the Harrington holding to deny federal jurisdiction to contract cases.78 Courts have also denied federal jurisdiction to
accounting cases whose classification as joint authorship or contract
cases is ambiguous. 79 Despite the holdings in these cases, however,
state courts have rarely taken up Harrington's invitation to litigate
copyright accounting cases. 80
C.

Cases Recognizing Federal Jurisdiction over
the Duty To Account

Like previous Second Circuit cases, T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 81
held that a dispute over an alleged assignment of copyright renewal
rights did not arise under the copyright laws and thus did not give rise
to federal jurisdiction. The reasoning employed by the Harms court,
however, differed from that of other Second Circuit cases such as Harrington, 82 which claimed that federal jurisdiction arose only in actions
of infringement. The Harms court concluded that in certain circumstances, remedies not expressly granted by the Copyright Act should
trigger federal jurisdiction. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, formulated a three-pronged test to guide courts in deciding when an ac77. Harrington, 186 F. Supp. at 657-58 (citations and footnote omitted).
78. See, e.g., Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(suit to declare a copyright assignment void by reason of fraud and to get an accounting for the
profits). Cresci held that, absent a claim of copyright infringement, "a federal court has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim of title to a copyright." 210 F. Supp. at 257; see Oddo
v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984) (parties were coowners of a book by means of a business
partnership). Citing Harrington, the Oddo court held that a suit to bring a coowner to account
"does not fall within the district court's jurisdiction," 743 F.2d at 633 n.2; i.e., it is a state law
matter. See also Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990) (in dicta, citing
with approval Oddo's holding that the duty to account does not derive from federal copyright
law); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (explaining the Oddo holding in dicta).
79. See, e.g., Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Newman v. Crowell, 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases have elements of contract and joint authorship cases. The plaintiff in Keith was allegedly a joint author who licensed his coauthor to exploit
the copyright; the plaintiff in Newman assigned his rights to his coauthor in return for royalties.
Both cases were dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the courts holding that
"[a]n action to establish title is not one 'arising under' the Copyright Act ...." Keith, 501 F.
Supp. at 970 (quoting Newman); Newman, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 519.
80. But see Mountain States Properties v. Robinson, 771 P.2d 5, 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(rare example of state court taking jurisdiction of a copyright accounting case on the authority of
Harrington and Oddo).
81. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
82. Harrington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.

2010

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:1998

tion involving a copyright arises under the copyright laws. This test
was the basis for recent cases holding that the duty to account arises
under the copyright laws in certain circumstances and thus should be
subject to federal jurisdiction. 8 3
The Harms test states that an action arises under the copyright
laws
[1] if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the
Act, ... or [2] asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act, • . . or,
[3] at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a
distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the
disposition of the claim. 84

The first prong of the Harms test merely covers the remedies for "a
suit for infringement" 85 now listed in chapter 5 of the current Copyright Act. 86 The next two prongs, however, expand the jurisdiction of
the court beyond actions solely for infringement.
Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky was the first case to establish
federal jurisdiction over the duty to account using the Harms test. 87
The plaintiff in Lieberman claimed to have coauthored a novel and
screenplay with the defendant. When the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of joint ownership and an accounting for the profits, the
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court determined that the central issue in the case was the resolution of the claim for joint authorship, which derives from the definition ofjoint work in the Copyright Act. 88 Relying on the second prong
of the Harms test, the court held that "[r]esolution of the central issue
in this case depends upon the application and interpretation of this
statutory definition" 89 and that the court thus had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.
Goodman v. Lee, 90 a Fifth Circuit case with similar facts, followed
the reasoning of Lieberman. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that she was a coauthor of a song as well as an accounting for
her share of the profits. The district court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The appeals court reversed, using the second prong of the Harms test
and citing Lieberman to validate federal jurisdiction.91 The Goodman
83. See Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky,
535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

84. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828.
85. 339 F.2d at 828.
86. 17 u.s.c. §§ 501-10 (1988).
87. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988).
89. Lieberman, 535 F. Supp. at 91.
90. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
91. Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1031-32. The reasoning of the Goodman court differed formally
from that of Lieberman, although the result was identical. Goodman held that resolution of the
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court attempted to distinguish this case from earlier Second Circuit
cases, including Harrington v. Mure, 92 denying federal jurisdiction in
copyright accounting cases. The court characterized the earlier cases
as contract cases, whereas Goodman and Lieberman involved the construction of the joint authorship provisions of the Act. 93 Goodman
implied that previous case law supported federal jurisdiction for joint
authorship cases but not for contract cases.94
Although Goodman's distinction between contract and joint authorship cases may be logical and correct, it does not accurately reflect
the cited case law. Previous cases decided in the Second Circuit denied federal jurisdiction to both types of copyright accounting cases. 95
The facts of Harrington, for example, are nearly identical to those of
Goodman: the plaintiff, alleging that he was a coauthor of a musical
composition, sought a declaration of coownership and an accounting
for his share of the profits, but the court denied federal jurisdiction.96
Both Goodman and Harrington are joint authorship cases, and both,
according to Goodman, should give rise to federal jurisdiction.97 The
Goodman court, despite its claims to the contrary, was thus unsuccessful in reconciling the earlier case law.

D. Summary of the Circuit Split
Until Lieberman was decided in 1984, the Second Circuit adhered
to a near-blanket rule that an action to establish title does not arise
under the Copyright Act and is thus a state law question. Since most
cases concerning the duty to account arise under disputes of title between joint owners, the Second Circuit relegated the duty to account
to state courts, barring supplementary or diversity jurisdiction. The
case depended on the interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 201(a),
rather than the statutory definition of joint work in 17 U.S.C. § 101. 815 F.2d at 1031-32.
92. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Harrington). The court also cited Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518
F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), and Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See
supra note 79 (discussing Keith).
93. Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1032.
94. "[T]he issue [in Rotardier] INVOLVED A CONTRACT, THE SUBJECT OF WHICH WAS A
COPYRIGHT. GOODMAN'S CLAIM, IN CLEAR CONTRAST, INVOLVES THE VALIDITY OF THE
COPYRIGHT ITSELF UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT." Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1032; see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-11 n.48 ("More precisely, the [Goodman] court should have
described Goodman's claim as raising the question of joint authorship under the Copyright Act,
as the validity of the copyright was not at issue in that case."). With this understanding, the
quoted language from Goodman distinguishes joint authorship cases, which give rise to federal
jurisdiction, from contract cases, which do not.
95. See supra section 11.B.
96. Harrington, 186 F. Supp. at 656; see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
97. The court was more accurate in its assessment of the other two cited cases. It correctly
characterized Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
as a contract case - no issue of joint authorship arose at all. On the other hand, Keith v.
Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), involved both joint authorship and contract issues.
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Ninth Circuit adopted this rule in Oddo v. Ries, 98 where it apparently
reigns unchallenged. The district court in Lieberman v. Estate of
Chayefsky 99 recently questioned the Second Circuit precedents by
granting federal jurisdiction over a claim for a declaration of copyright
title and an accounting. The Fifth Circuit followed the Lieberman
analysis in Goodman v. Lee. 100
Thus, the rule in the Ninth Circuit renders the duty to account a
state law question. Federal courts in the Fifth Circuit accept jurisdiction over duty-to-account claims in cases involving joint authorship.
The Second Circuit rule is itself unsettled; under Lieberman, the most
recent case, the duty to account will also be decided by federal courts
in cases involving joint authorship.
The Fifth Circuit attempted to resolve this divergence by claiming
that in all circuits an action to establish title, and the concomitant
duty to account, arises under federal copyright law when the claim
involves a dispute over joint authorship; when the claim involves a
contract dispute, however, an action to establish title flows from state
common law principles. 101 Although the logic of this position may be
sound, it does not accurately reflect the present state of the case law in
the Second and Ninth Circuits. In these circuits, joint authorship
claims have been held not to arise under the copyright laws, and the
holdings of both contract and joint authorship cases are often written
in language that categorically excludes from federal courts any actions
other than actions for infringement. Part Ill of this Note sorts out the
logic underlying these positions.
III.

THE CLAIM FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DUTY

ToAccouNT
A federal court that has received a copyright complaint requesting
an accounting must consider two questions before it can exercise juris. diction. First, it must ask whether the duty to account is federal or a
state law. After this preliminary inquiry, it may go on to ask whether
federal court is the correct forum for the complaint.
The first question - the source of the duty to account - allows at
least two possible answers. A court may hold that copyright ownership, although established by federal law, is merely another form of
ownership, governed by ordinary state common law rules. In this
view, copyright coowners would be treated like tenants in common of
any other type of property. 102 Section III.A argues the contrary the98. 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
100. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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sis: the duty to account, created by the federal courts as federal common law and ratified by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976, is
more properly considered federal law.
Section III.B discusses the second question, that of the correct forum. If the duty to account comes from federal common law, the federal courts have jurisdiction. The question grows more complicated,
however, if courts consider the duty to account to be state law. This
section argues that joint authorship cases should trigger federal jurisdiction, even if the source of the accounting remedy is state law, because of the federal interest in construing the joint authorship
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. Only if the plaintiff claims
rights by virtue of contract rights alone - that is, by assignment of
copyright - should the federal court dismiss the case in favor of state
jurisdiction.
Section III.C discusses the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to copyright accounting cases. It concludes that if the duty
to account is federal law, the rule will not bar federal jurisdiction. If
the duty to account is state law, an allegation of joint authorship in the
complaint should satisfy the rule.
A.

The Source of the Duty To Account

This section gives two reasons for considering the accounting rule
to be a federal remedy. First, the federal courts created the rule by
federal common law. Second, Congress ratified the rule in the Copyright Act of 1976. These developments demonstrate that the source of
the duty to account is federal.
1. Federal Common Law
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 103 courts have viewed judicial
decisionmaking that creates federal common law with suspicion.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]here is no federal
general common law" 104 did not end the creation of all federal common law. The Erie Court simply held that federal courts sitting in·
diversity actions must apply the common law of the states to such
actions, not a separate federal general common law. 105 On the same
day that the Court decided Erie, it affirmed that federal courts retained the power to create common law in areas of federal
competence. 106
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. 304 U.S. at 78.
105. 304 U.S. at 78.
106. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (holding that federal common law controlled a border dispute between two states); see also Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (applicability of state tort law to government
defense contractors):
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Courts and commentators have justified the creation of federal
common law in several ways, 101 at least three of which may justify the
creation of a federal duty to account. First, Congress may have omitted a remedy for joint owners through inadvertence, forcing the courts
to create one as an interstitial, gap-filling measure. Second, Congress
may have delegated lawmaking power to the federal courts by providing a skeletal legislative scheme, with the expectation that the courts
would formulate detailed substantive law as needed. Third, a dominant federal interest in the rights of joint copyright owners may require a federal common law solution and a preemption of state law.
This section discusses each of these justifications in turn to see whether
they provide adequate support for creating a federal accounting rule.
First, Congress may have simply overlooked the problem, even
though it intended to apply federal law. Statute-making is necessarily
incomplete because of defects in the political process and the limitations of human foresight. 108 Inadvertent omission is especially likely
in copyright law, which is complex and apt to be removed from the
experience of most legislators. When a statute is in some way incomplete, the courts often fill the gap. 109 The 1909 Act made no explicit
reference to joint ownership, 110 but the statute set up the framework in
which two authors may jointly create a work, thereby necessitating an
apportionment of rights between them. If the statute is silent, but
Congress intended federal law to apply in this area, the federal courts
have an obligation to supply the missing terms.
Second, Congress may have intended to delegate to the federal
courts the power to create substantive law as needed. Courts have
often found an implicit delegation of authority to the courts when confronted with a skeletal legislative scheme. 111 Although the 1909 Act
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," .•. are so committed by the Constitu·
tion and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and re·
placed, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory
directive) by the courts - so-called "federal common law."
487 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted).
107. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7 (1985) (discus·
sion of the situations in which federal courts have applied federal common law).
108. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of ''Federal Law'~· Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1957).
109. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180-87 (1949) (determining the meaning of
vague words in the statute); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 68 (1953) (discussion of cases where the federal courts supplied missing statutes of limita·
tions). Some consider such interstitial lawmaking to be statutory interpretation, rather than
common Jaw. But see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death
of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 332 (1980) (asserting that the difference between statutory
interpretation and common law is "a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind").
110. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (repealed 1976) (codification of the Copyright Act of 1909 with amendments); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 6-2 n.l.
111. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (constru·
ing jurisdictional statute to be an implicit delegation of authority to fashion a body of federal
labor Jaw). Most common are the cases in which the courts find an implied private right of
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as a whole cannot be considered skeletal, the complete lack of reference to joint ownership suggests, if not inadvertence, an implicit delegation of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps. 112
Inadvertent omission or congressional delegation of authority seem
plausible in light of the highly specialized nature of copyright legislation. The people that it affects are small in number and concentrated
in a few narrow geographic areas. Legislators are unlikely to be familiar with the subject, and they are even less likely to have a great deal of
interest in the details of the statute they enact. Inevitably, experts either a few interested legislators, or, more likely, representatives of
the affected industries - will draft the statute, and legislators will vote
on it with little idea of what it actually contains. 113 Thus, legislative
intent, always difficult to determine, is especially nebulous in copyright law.
The peculiar qualities of the 1909 Act make congressional intent
even more difficult to ascertain. The 1909 Act is a curious mixture of
extreme specificity in some places and broad generalizations in
others. 114 "[T]he statute ... leaves the development of fundamentals
to the judges. Indeed the courts have had to be consulted at nearly
every point, for the text of the statute has a maddeningly casual prolixity and imprecision throughout." 115 The haphazard quality of this
statute, coupled with the abstruseness of the subject to most legislators, makes a conclusive determination of specific congressional intent
hopeless in many cases. This intent is even more elusive when one is
action in a vaguely worded statute. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private
right of action implied from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The Court has recently been
more reluctant to create such private rights of action. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Robert H.A. Ashford, Implied Causes ofAction Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to
Barak. 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984). Borak, however, involved a subject that had previously
been regulated by the states (corporate law). The Supreme Court's reluctance to legitimize federal common law remedies in every corporate law context thus seems reasonable. But the Court
may not show equal reluctance to legitimize federal co=on law remedies created in copyright
law, an exclusively federal domain.
112. An implicit delegation seems especially likely, given the jurisprudence of the day. The
federal courts in 1909 operated under the pre-Erie rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), which allowed the federal courts to create general co=on law to govern diversity disputes rather than applying state rules of decision. Thus, Congress would have been aware of the
wide powers of the federal courts to fashion co=on law when it enacted the Copyright Act of
1909, and it might have expected the courts to use those powers in interpreting the Act.
113. The legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress generally left negotiation of
specific provisions to interested industries, with legislators acting as mediators to keep the negotiations on track. See Litman, supra note 57, at 870-71. Since the problems of drafting the 1909
Act were probably not too dissimilar from those of the 1976 Act, industry was probably also
highly involved in shaping the 1909 Act.
114. The 1909 Act is "crammed with details on matters ranging from the formalities of notice, registration, and so forth," while large questions, such as what elements of a work are
protectable, or what takings are actionable, are left open. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF CoPYRIGHT 38-40 (1967).
115. Id. at 40.
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searching for the reason for omission of a provision, rather than the
reason for inclusion.
Given the absence of direct evidence of congressional intent concerning the lack of joint ownership provisions in the 1909 Act, evidence of congressional intent must come indirectly from
considerations of general policy. These policy considerations argue
against an intention to leave the rights of joint copyright owners to the
states. Suppose Congress intended that the states should choose how
to handle the rights of joint copyright owners. The states would have
at least three contradictory ways of doing so: each owner might be
required to get permission from all other owners before exploiting the
copyright (the English rule); 116 each owner might be free to exploit the
copyright subject to a duty to account (the present accounting rule); 117
or each owner might be free to exploit the copyright without any duty
to account (as in patent law). 118 Allowing the states to choose any of
these three would make the rights of copyright coowners uncertain.
Furthermore, even assuming each state decided to use the analogy of
tenancy-in-common, the application might vary from state to state. 119
The rights afforded to joint owners might vary, for example, depending on a state court's choice between the rules of coownership of real
property as compared to personal property. 120
Allowing the states to determine the rights of a copyright coowner
is contrary to all the statutory sources of copyright law: first, the
copyright statutes aim for national uniformity of rights; 121 second, the
jurisdictional statute gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over copyrights, 122 and finally, a constitutional provision allows the
federal government, not the states, to establish an author's exclusive
right to his writings.123 If Congress in this instance intended to legislate contrary to its general policy of uniformity of copyright remedy, it
116. See Note, supra note 10, at 1558.
117. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1988) (allowing joint owners of a patent to exploit their invention
without accounting to the other owners).
119. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 321-24 (2d ed. 1988).
120. See Note, supra note 10, at 1554-55 (general discussion of common law tenancy-in·
common).
121. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-801 (1988).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). The statute that codified exclusive copyright jurisdiction
was passed in 1874. Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (pt. 1) 134-35 (''The jurisdiction
vested in the courts of the United States •.. shall be exclusive of the courts of the several States:
..• [o]f all cases arising under the ... copyright laws of the United States."). Federal recognition
of the desirability of having nationally uniform federal copyright remedies thus existed when the
Copyright Act of 1909 was passed.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This policy favoring national uniformity of copyright law
dates back to James Madison, who wrote that "[t]he States cannot separately make effectual
provision" for copyright and patent law. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 338 (James Madison)
(John C. Hamilton ed., 1868).
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would likely do so expressly, rather than by simple omission of any
relevant provision.
In sum, the omission of provisions relating to the rather obscure
problems of joint authorship was likely either an inadvertent omission
or a congressional delegation of authority to fill in gaps in the statutory language. The least likely possibility, given the nature of the statute and the policy considerations outlined above, is that Congress or
the drafters actually had a specific intent to leave the remedies afforded joint authors to the states, and that they chose to show this
intent by simple omission of any relevant provision.
The third and final justification for the use of federal common law
- protection of a dominant federal interest - comes from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 124
which "instructs us that even in the absence of express statute, federal
law may govern what might seem an issue of local law because the
federal interest is dominant." 125 The federal government's overriding
interest in national uniformity of rights of copyright owners may be a
sufficient justification for creation of the duty to account and the preemption of any contrary state law by the federal courts. 126 Under the
Clearfield Trust doctrine, the courts should enforce the duty to account until Congress makes clear in legislation that it does not consider such a remedy to be in the federal interest.
Preemption of state law and creation of federal common law on
this ground does not depend on a specific congressional intent in 1909
to delegate authority to the courts. Congress may have given absolutely no thought to the problems of joint ownership. Nevertheless, if
the federal courts determine that federal interests would be impaired if
state law were applied, they may impose a federal common law
solution. 127
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the
124. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In a dispute over whether a state rule should apply to co=ercial
paper issued by the U.S. government, the Court held that in the absence of a federal statute, "it is
for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule oflaw according to their own standards." 318
U.S. at 367.
125. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1964) (commenting on the
application of the Cleaifield Trust doctrine to a copyright case); see also Mishkin, supra note 108,
at 801: "Though this language [of the Cleaifield decision] speaks directly only of the United
States, •.• the basic rationale underlying this passage would seem equally apposite to any issue
bearing a substantial relation to an established national government function."
126. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Dominant Federal Interest May Be a Possible Basis for
Federal Jurisdiction, 1965 DUKE L.J. 828, 834 (discussing Hanns and suggesting that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338, the copyright jurisdiction statute, should be interpreted broadly so as to encompass those
copyright cases involving a strong federal interest).
127. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 84 (1st ed. 1980):
The presence of federal legislation manifests a congressional determination that important
federal interests are at stake, which supersede any competing state concerns. While Congress may not have considered the specific issue before the court, it may still be appropriate
in such cases for the federal judiciary to develop its own legal principles.
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courts with much evidence about congressional purposes and federal
interests in copyright. For example, the legislative history of section
301, which abolished state common law copyright law, 128 shows that
national uniformity of copyright protection is an important goal of
copyright law:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and
in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods
for dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and
faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional intent. 129

The federal courts may use this explicitly stated federal interest in national uniformity to justify preempting conflicting state laws and replacing them with a uniform federal duty to account.
By acknowledging that the accounting rule is federal law, federal
courts will adjudicate cases that would otherwise have gone to state
courts. 130 Some of these cases may not actually tum on federal issues,
and one might argue that a federal accounting remedy is therefore
overinclusive. For example, one of the parties in T.B. Harms v.
Eliscu 131 sought an accounting. At issue was whether one of the coauthors had previously assigned away his renewal rights. Had the court
granted federal jurisdiction, the central issue litigated would have been
the state contract issue.
Two grounds justify the possible overinclusiveness of a federal accounting remedy. First, many of the cases where plaintiffs seek an
accounting involve disputes between joint authors. The federal government has a strong interest in uniform interpretation of the joint
See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. R.Bv. 1,
46 (1985):
Preemptive lawmaking rests on the idea that federal courts can establish legal rule X. even
where there is no specific intention that they do so, provided it can be shown that rule X is
necessary in order to avoid frustrating federal policy Y, as to which there is a manifestation
of specific intent on the part of the enacting body.
Under Professor Merrill's analysis, creating a federal duty to account is legitimate, even in the
absence of a specific congressional intent to delegate authority to do so, as long as the court can
show that failing to create this remedy will frustrate a clear federal policy, such as uniformity of
copyright remedy.
128. Before 1976, copyright in unpublished works was initially secured by state common law
copyright. Federal protection became effective only upon publication of the work. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988), abolished this dual system of copyright laws. The
explicit preemption of state law in this area provides an analogy for the courts to follow in
displacing any vestigial state law of joint ownership with a federal duty to account.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976).
130. See infra section III.B. l.
131. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
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authorship provisions of the Copyright Act. 132 Without a federal accounting rule, these issues of joint authorship may be left to state
courts. 133
Second, the federal interest in uniformity of remedy outweighs the
burden of having the federal courts adjudicate even those accounting
cases where the federal issues are peripheral. Without a federal accounting rule, states would be free to choose among various ways of
allocating rights among coowners of copyright. 134 Only plaintiffs who
allege infringement would have the benefit of a uniform federal rule.
The provisions for copyright infringement demonstrate that Congress is willing to allow an overinclusive remedy to protect the federal
interest in uniformity of remedy. To obtain federal jurisdiction, a
copyright infringement plaintiff must show three things: the plaintiff's
ownership of the copyright; copying by the defendant; and distribution
for exhibition. 135 Ownership usually involves only state law contract
issues. But even when the defendant concedes copyfug and distribution, leaving ownership as the only issue in dispute, the complaint confers federal jurisdiction. 136 The federal interest lies in uniform, expert
application of the federal remedy. The same federal interest arises in
an accounting case in which the only dispute is over contract issues.
The state interest in hearing these cases is small. Although states
have a legitimate interest in enforcing their contract laws, the federal
courts have been the primary adjudicators of copyright law, including
many cases that involve state law contract disputes, since federal jurisdiction over copyrights became exclusive over a century ago. 137 A
state's loss of jurisdiction over this small class of specialized cases will
only marginally reduce that state's ability to enforce its contract law.
In any event, the Erie doctrine requires a federal judge who tries an
accounting case that involves state contract principles to follow state
132. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1987) (joint authorship
case involved "the application and interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of 17
U.S.C. § 201(a)"); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("Resolution of the central issue [in a joint authorship case] ... depends upon the application
and interpretation of [the] statutory definition" of joint work, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).).
133. The federal interest in adjudicating joint authorship claims may be sufficiently strong
that such cases might justify federal jurisdiction even without a federal accounting remedy. See
discussion infra section 111.B.2. But federal jurisdiction is assured if the accounting remedy is
federal.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
135. See Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1987).
136. See Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1988);
Cohen, 817 F.2d at 73-74; see also Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 971
(4th Cir. 1990) ("The difficulty or centrality of ... state law questions cannot defeat jurisdiction"
over a complaint that properly alleges copyright infringement.).
137. Exclusive federal copyright jurisdiction was codified in 1874 by the Act of June 22,
1874, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (pt. 1) 134, 134-35 (repealed 1909).
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contract law. 138 Thus, federal courts will vindicate state interests in
the small number of cases taken from state courts.
2.

Congressional Ratification of the Federal Duty To Account

Although policy considerations suggest that Congress intended to
allow the federal courts to create federal common law rules governing
joint ownership, 139 the only direct expression of congressional intent
before 1976 came from congressional failure to pass a statute overruling the federal courts. Courts and commentators generally consider
such a failure to act to be weak evidence of congressional intent. 140
The Copyright Act of 1976, however, completely revised the 1909
Act 141 and provided fresh evidence of congressional intent.
The 1976 Act mentions joint ownership explicitly in two places. It
offers a definition of joint work, 142 and it provides that joint authors
are "coowners of copyright in the work." 143 Thus, the 1976 Act
shows that Congress intended joint authorship at least to be determined by reference to federal statute, not state common law.
Although the 1976 Act does not mention the duty to account or
coownership in general, the legislative history shows unequivocally
that Congress intended to retain the duty to account. The House
Committee Report on section 201, after first stating that "court-made
law on this point is left undisturbed," 144 expressly set out the duty to
account: coowners are to be "treated generally as tenants in common,
with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the
use of the work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners
"145

138. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-3 to -4 ("[C]ontractual rights [concerning copyright] are a matter of state law.").
139. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
140. "Ordinarily, 'Congress' silence is just that - silence.' " Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (quoting Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686
(1987)).
141. Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, wrote of the 1976 Act:
The New Act is ..• a completely new copyright statute, intended to deal with a whole range
of problems undreamed of by the drafters of the 1909 Act•... Properly designated, the New
Act is not a "general revision," but is as radical a departure as was our first copyright
statute, in 1790.
Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479
(1977) (footnote omitted).
The Copyright Act of 1909, on the other hand, was mostly "a bringing together of scattered
statutory provisions with relatively few changes or innovations." Id.
142. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988). Joint authors, although undefined, are presumably persons who produce a joint
work.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
144. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976). See supra text accompanying
note 21.
145. Id. For a full text of this part of the report, see supra text accompanying note 21.
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This language demonstrates that Congress envisioned a national,
uniform remedy for coowners. 146 Such a remedy will only occur if it is
federal law, binding on all courts. 147 Leaving the states free to choose
not to enforce a duty to account, or to require the consent of all
coowners before exploitation of the copyright, would undermine congressional intent.
Tracing the legislative history chronologically from 1961 to 1965
by means of the Copyright Law Revision provides a similarly straightforward understanding of the legislative intent. 148 The original 1961
report of the Register of Copyrights recommended omitting any mention of the accounting rule in the statute in order to maintain the rule
intact from previous case law. 149 This recommendation generated few
comments and little controversy. 150 The resulting provisions regarding coownership in the 1964 preliminary draft of the new copyright
law were almost identical to those finally passed by Congress in
1976. 151 In short, the drafters of the coownership provisions of the
1976 Act essentially borrowed the original 1961 recommendations of
the Copyright Office. The purpose of the provisions, as embodied in
the House Committee Report, also remained unchanged.
The case law ratified by the 1976 statute held that the duty to account was a federal remedy. Although neither Congress nor the
courts likely contemplated the jurisdictional question before the drafters of the Act began work in 1961, the basic outlines of the accounting
remedy at that time were fairly clear. By 1976, the duty to account
146. The statute does not say that the courts are to apply the rules oftenancy-in·common of
the several states. Using state law would imply nonuniformity of remedy. Furthermore, if the
law between joint owners were to be left to the states, Congress would have no power to choose
tenancy-in-common over, say, joint tenancy as a desirable judicial solution. See supra notes 11620 and accompanying text.
147. The Supreme Court has held that state courts must apply federal common law. Local
174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
148. Most of the work of writing the 1976 Act was done by the collaboration of the Register
of Copyrights with various interested industry groups between 1961 and 1965 and presented to
Congress in the five-part Copyright Law Revision. See 1-5 STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 87TH-89TH CONG., CoPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
CoPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. CoPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 196165) [hereinafter CoPYRIGHT LAW REVISION].
149. "The rules established by the court decisions in regard to co-owners of a copyright that any one co-owner may use or license the use of the work, but that he must account for
profits to the other co-owners - should be left undisturbed." 1 Id. at 90. The Copyright Office
saw "no need to restate [these rules] in the statute." 1 Id. at 89.
150. A few consultants unsuccessfully recommended changes. For example, Irwin Karp and
Melville B. Nimmer recommended adopting the English rule, in which all coowners must agree
before the work is exploited. See 2 id. at 318, 374.
151. "The authors of a joint work shall be considered co-owners of copyright in the work."
A footnote added that a joint work "would be defined elsewhere as a work prepared by two or
more authors in collaboration or with the intention that their contributions be merged into indistinguishable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S.
Copyright Law § 14(a), reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 148, at 15. Cf. 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 20l(a) (1988) (definition of joint work; status of joint owners).
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was a well-established rule, created and applied universally by the federal courts to all copyright coowners regardless of their state residence.152 Regardless of whether the jurisdiction to hear these cases
came from federal question jurisdiction153 or the copyright and patent
jurisdiction statute, 154 the federal courts - and implicitly Congress considered the duty to account to be a federal remedy.1 55
Even if one ignores the legislative history entirely and looks only at
the language of the statute, the Copyright Act of 1976 ratifies previous
case law regarding the duty to account. Congressional silence in the
Act is stronger evidence of congressional intent than silence before enactment.156 Congressional silence regarding the accounting rule, especially in an act that is such a radical rethinking of previous copyright
law, 157 strongly implies a congressional satisfaction with the status
quo.
In sum, the federal courts created the duty to account between
copyright coowners through a legitimate use of federal common law.
The creation of the duty to account can be considered either an interstitial, gap-filling measure, or the result of an implicit delegation of
authority from Congress to create detailed law on joint ownership.
Congress ratified this federal common law solution when it passed the
Copyright Act of 1976. In its Committee Reports, Congress approved
of the court-made law regarding the duty to account and set out the
details of that law explicitly. The duty to account is thus federal law,
and it should be binding on all courts, state or federal.
B. Jurisdiction

Federal jurisdiction in copyright cases, like all federal question ju152. See supra section II.A.
153. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
155. Beginning in 1958 with Gorham v. Edwards, 164 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), a few
courts in which the plaintiff demanded an accounting began questioning this jurisdictional as·
sumption. See Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Harrington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also supra section 11.B. The courts
denied jurisdiction in these cases, declaring that they turned on questions of state contract law or
copyright ownership, which traditionally have not given rise to federal jurisdiction. 3 NIMMER,
supra note 1, § 12.0l[A]. The courts apparently considered the duty to account an ancillary
issue; for example, in Gorham, the court made no mention of the duty to account at all except in
its recital of the facts. 164 F. Supp. at 782. The legislative history provides no indication that the
drafters of the Copyright Act of 1976 considered these decisions. These cases seem to oppose the
congressional intent to define a uniform national duty to account, discussed supra notes 145-47.
156. The Supreme Court endorsed this sort of evidence from silence in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), a case involving a private right of action
under a federal securities statute that occurred after Congress had amended the statute. When
Congress amended the statute, the Court reasoned, it must have known that courts were routinely implying private rights of action to enforce the statute's provisions. Nevertheless, Congress did not prohibit such private rights of action in the amendment. The Court took this as
implicit consent to the status quo.
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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risdiction, initially derives from the constitutional clause extending
federal judicial power to all cases "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority." 158 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause to give Congress the power to confer jurisdiction whenever a
federal law is an "ingredient" of a cause of action. 159 Because federal
copyright law is an ingredient of any copyright case, federal jurisdiction over the duty to account turns on whether Congress has chosen to
confer jurisdiction by statute.
This section shows that jurisdiction for copyright accounting cases
depends on whether the courts hold that the accounting rule is federal
or state law. If the accounting rule is federal law, as argued in section
III.A above, the copyright jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdiction. Even if courts hold that the accounting remedy is state common
law, the jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdiction for joint authorship cases, leaving only contract cases to be adjudicated solely in
state courts.
1. Federal Accounting Rule
Section III.A argued that the duty to account is a common law
creation of the federal courts and is thus a federal remedy. A federal
common law remedy gives rise to federal jurisdiction in the same way
as an explicit statutory remedy. 160 Thus, any copyright coowner who
seeks an accounting should be able to raise his claim in federal court.
Because courts developed the duty to account to fill a gap in the copyright laws, jurisdiction over the accounting rule falls under section
1338, the patent and copyright jurisdiction statute, 161 rather than section 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute. 162 Section 1338
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. 16 3 Accounting rule
158. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
159. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824); see also 13B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 22 (discussing the extreme breadth of constitutionally
permitted federal jurisdiction).
160. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("§ 1331 [federal question]
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory
origin."); REDISH, supra note 127, at 96 (2d ed. 1990) ("It is also established that a case may
'arise under' federal common law, as well as under statutory or constitutional provisions.");
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883,
897 (1986).
The copyright jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988), should support federal common
law claims as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). "No essential variance in the construction of
'arising under' is noticeable in the individual application of the [jurisdiction] statutes." Note,
supra note 126, at 828 n.4.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
162. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988).
163. '.'[J]urisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases." 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). One could argue that the accounting remedy falls under the provisions
of § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute, which gives concurrent federal jurisdiction
over actions arising under "the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
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claims should therefore trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction.
2. State Accounting Rule

This section assumes arguendo that the duty to account is a state
common law rule. It argues that even without a federal accounting
rule, the language of the copyright jurisdiction statute is broad enough
to give federal jurisdiction over some of the cases in which an accounting is sought: those in which a dispute arises between copyright coauthors. These cases, unlike those involving coowners whose rights arise
by contract, involve the interpretation of the joint ownership provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. The federal interest in the correct
interpretation of these provisions suffices to confer federal jurisdiction,
even if the remedy sought is held to exist only under state law.
The general federal question jurisdiction statute 164 and the statute
dealing specifically with copyrights and other intellectual property 16 5
have "arising under" language nearly identical to that of Article III;
federal courts, however, have never interpreted these statutes to confer
federal jurisdiction whenever the constitutional "ingredient" test is
satisfied. 166 Courts have created self-imposed limits to federal jurisdiction for reasons of policy: for example, to avoid usurping the role of
the state courts in the federal system, to leave to the states those cases
that tum predominantly on state issues, and to avoid overburdening
the federal system with cases that only marginally bear on federal
interests. 167
§ 1331 (1988). This language is more general than that of§ 1338, which requires that the action
arise under an "Act of Congress relating to •.• copyrights •••." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
"Laws ... of the United States" might more easily include federal common law than an "Act of
Congress." See Edward H. Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REV. 313,
34-0 n.101 (1972) (discussing the analogous case of federal common law of patent agreements).
The argument for concurrent jurisdiction is strained, however. The duty to account was
developed to effectuate the policies of the copyright laws, whose grant of jurisdiction comes
under § 1338. Moreover, after the implicit ratification of the duty to account in the Copyright
Act of 1976, an action for an accounting can now be said to arise under an "Act of Congress
relating to •.. copyrights," i.e., the Copyright Act of 1976.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ••• copyrights • • • • Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ••• copyright cases."
166. "This Court has never held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Art.
III 'arising under' jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true.... Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction
is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under§ 1331 •.•." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461U.S.480, 494-95 (1983). For example, a case involving a disputed assignment or
license of a copyright does not trigger federal jurisdiction, even though the existence of a copyright forms an "ingredient" of the cause of action. See, e.g., Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F.
Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3582, at 310; 3 NIMMER, supra
note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-15.
167. If the ingredient theory of Article III had been carried over to the general grant of
federal question jurisdiction now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there would have been no
basis - to take a well-known example - why federal courts should not have jurisdiction as
to all disputes over the many western land titles originating in a federal patent, even though
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Copyright accounting cases, however, present countervailing considerations weighing in favor of federal jurisdiction, including the desire for national uniformity of remedy and the need for adjudication
by a tribunal with expertise in federal issues. 168 The policies favoring
federal jurisdiction vary depending on the type of copyright accounting case presented to the court. Joint authorship cases implicate federal interests to a greater degree than contract cases because the rights
of joint authors are specifically addressed in the Copyright Act of
1976. 169 Contract cases, on the other hand, involve mostly issues of
state law.
The best-known test to determine whether a claim "arises under"
the federal jurisdiction statutes is the three-prong test devised by
Judge Friendly in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu. 170 If, as posited, the duty
to account is a state remedy, a claim for an accounting does not fall
under the first prong of the Harms test - "a remedy expressly granted
by the [Copyright] Act" 171 - because only actions for infringement
have an express remedy in the 1976 Act. 172 Contract cases fail the
second prong of the Harms test as well: "a claim requiring construction of the [Copyright] Act." 173 An assignment of a copyright asserts
no claim requiring construction of the Act. These issues are based in
state law contract rights and require adjudication no different from
any other contract claim. Nor do contract cases fall under the third
prong: courts have never held that a copyright assignment implicates
"a distinctive policy of the Act [that] requires that federal principles
control." 174
the controverted questions normally are of fact or of local land law. Quite sensibly, such
extensive jurisdiction has been denied.
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 26, § 3562, at 22.
168. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 35 (1965) (Tentative Draft No. 3) commentary on
§ 131 l(b) ("In patent and copyright cases the federal courts ... have experience, which the state
courts lack .•.•"). For the historical rationale behind the need for the federal judiciary, see
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 2-3 (1989) (explaining the need for uniformity
and the fear of state hostility to federal interests). For policy rationales favoring exclusive federal
adjudication of the related field of patent law agreements, see Cooper, supra note 163, at 315.
169. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (1988).
170. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964). See supra text accompanying note 84 for the full text of
the Harms test.
171. 339 F.2d at 828.
172. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (1988). A federal common law remedy should trigger federal jurisdiction, however, just as an express remedy would. See supra section 111.B.1. This first prong
appears to have come from Justice Holmes' statement that "[a] suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,
260 (1916), modified by Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983). A federal common law remedy fits as well as an express remedy under this test.
173. 339 F.2d at 828.
174. 339 F.2d at 828; see 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.0l[A], at 12-3 to -4. But see Cooper,
supra note 163, at 340-44 (advocating federal jurisdiction for all contract cases in the analogous
field of patent agreements).
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Joint authorship cases, however, will often present a claim requiring construction of the joint authorship provisions of the Act. 175 Such
cases satisfy the second prong of the Harms test. 176 Construction of
the joint authorship provisions of the 1976 Act by the federal courts is
especially important after Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid. 111 Because Reid restricted the work-for-hire doctrine, claims of
joint authorship are likely to increase in number, creating new
problems of statutory construction for the courts to resolve. 178 Courts
do not agree on how much work a person must contribute before rising to the status of coauthor. 179 Moreover, additional joint ownership
cases may cause courts to rethink the present rule that allows two
coauthors who make substantially differing contributions to receive
equal shares in the resulting accounting. Federal jurisdiction is more
likely to lead to uniform solutions to these questions of construction of
the 1976 Act.180
. The federal courts should take jurisdiction, however, only when
they must construe the joint authorship provisions of the Act. Even
when the parties are joint authors, the pleadings may show that they
do not dispute any issue of joint authorship. For example, one joint
author may contest the other author's performance of an agreement
concerning the joint work. If the pleadings show that neither party
disputes joint authorship, the case is actually a simple contract case,
even though it involves a contract between joint authors. Such a case
does not require construction of the Act and does not require federal
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a case contains bona fide disputes
over both joint authorship and contract issues, courts should grant
federal jurisdiction. The mere presence of contract issues should not
deny federal jurisdiction to a case that would otherwise qualify because of unresolved joint authorship questions.181
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of joint work); 17 U.S.C.§ 20l(a) (1988) (vesting ini·
tial title to the copyright in the joint authors).
176. This prong of the Harms test comes from Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, 255 U.S.
180 (1921), a case concerning jurisdiction under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Harms,
339 F.2d at 827. The court in Harms cites De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), as an
application of this principle under the copyright jurisdiction statute, currently at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1988). But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 26 n.24 (questioning the
value of De Sylva as precedent because the Court did not discuss jurisdiction and so is not bound
by the decision).
177. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
178. See supra section I.B.
179. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
180. Although the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he novelty of [a federal] issue is not
sufficient to give it status as a federal cause of action," Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thomp·
son, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986), the novelty of joint authorship issues is only one reason to confer
federal jurisdiction. Federal courts will also produce more uniform decisions and bring their
expertise in copyright law to bear.
181. Under this analysis, the courts wrongly decided Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), and Newman v. Crowell, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), when they
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Two copyright accounting cases have recognized federal jurisdiction under the statutory construction prong of the Harms test. 182
Both cases concerned disputed coauthorship, not assignment. Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky 183 held that the resolution of the case depended on the application and interpretation of the statutory definition
of joint work; 184 Goodman v. Lee 185 held that the resolution depended
on the copyright ownership provisions. 186 These two cases offer good
examples of courts correctly applying the Harms test to grant federal
jurisdiction. Under this analysis, however, the court's denial offederal
jurisdiction in Harrington v. Mure 187 would have been incorrect had
the case arisen under the Copyright Act of 1976. The plaintiff in Harrington claimed relief based on his alleged coauthorship of a work,
which would have required an interpretation of the statutory provisions regarding joint authorship.188
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed the Harms test.
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 159
the Supreme Court quoted the Harms test and enunciated a similar
two-prong test for determining federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. The complaint must establish "either [1] that federal law .
creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law." 19° This test seems to be an implicit restatement of the Harms
test. The first prong of the Franchise Tax Board test apparently derives from the same source as the first prong of the Harms test. 191
denied federal jurisdiction because both presented contract issues. Both cases presented bona fide
issues of joint authorship as well as contract issues. See supra note 79.
182. Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535
F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). These cases are discussed supra notes 87-97 and accompanying
text.
183. 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
. 184. 535 F. Supp at 91; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
185. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
186. 815 F.2d at 1031-32; see 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
187. 186 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
188. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. On the other hand, contract cases such
as Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), and Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984), which did not involve any dispute over joint authorship, were
correctly decided when the courts denied federal jurisdiction. See supra note 78.
The third prong of the Harms test - the "dominant federal interest" test - may also trigger
jurisdiction by justifying the creation of federal common law, from which jurisdiction may follow. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. No opinion has yet relied on this prong,
perhaps because of the obvious applicability of the second prong.
189. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). This case dealt with a state suit by the California Tax Board to
compel the Trust to pay certain tax levies. The Trust, which claimed that the levies were preempted by federal law (BRISA), removed the suit to federal court. 463 U.S. at 4-7. The
Supreme Court held that the federal courts did not have federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). 463 U.S. at 28.
190. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28.
191. "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works
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This prong of the Franchise Tax Board test may also confer federal
jurisdiction over actions based on federal common law remedies, 192 as
well as actions that implicate a dominant federal interest, 193 the third
prong of the Harms test. The second prongs of both the Harms and
the Franchise Tax Board tests are substantially similar, 194 and apparently derive from the same source. 195 Thus, the Supreme Court's twoprong te8t implicitly endorses the substance of the Harms test.1 96
On the other hand, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 197 the Supreme Court narrowly read its Franchise Tax Board test.
The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow sued under Ohio law, which recognized a
private tort action against defendants who violated a federal drug regulatory statute. 198 The federal statute created no federal private remedies, however. 199 After repeating the Franchise Tax Board test, 200 the
Court denied federal jurisdiction, even under the second, "substantial
question of federal law" prong of the test. Read narrowly, this opinion
denies federal jurisdiction unless federal law creates the cause of
action. 201
Neither Franchise Tax Board nor Merrell Dow, however, is exactly
on point: Franchise Tax Board is an application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule202 to a declaratory judgment action, and Merrell Dow
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (the Holmes test), modified by Franchise
Tax Bd. Cf. the first prong of the Harms test: "[A]n action 'arises under' the Copyright Act if
and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act •••• " 339 F.2d at 828.
192. The "federal law" that "creates the cause of action" could as easily be federal common
law as a federal statute.
193. Whatever federal law creates the dominant federal interest could be said to "create the
cause of action."
194. Compare Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (holding that an action arises under the Copyright
Act if the complaint "asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act") with Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 28 (federal courts have jurisdiction when "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law").
195. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), cited with approval in
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9, and Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.
196. In the end, the Court denied federal jurisdiction over the claim for reasons unrelated to
its test for jurisdiction. The Court held that the complaint failed to satisfy the well-pleaded
complaint rule as applied to a state declaratory judgment action. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at
13-22.
•
197. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
198. 478 U.S. at 805-06.
199. 478 U.S. at 806-07.
200. The Court cited Franchise Tax Board for the propositions that a case may arise under
federal law where "federal law creates the cause of action," 478 U.S. at 808, and where " 'the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.' "
478 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9).
201. We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of
a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private,
federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.''
478 U.S. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)).
202. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (discussing the well-pleaded complaint
rule).
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concerns state incorporation of a federal regulatory standard. 203
Neither case predicts what courts would do if confronted with a copyright accounting case that included an allegation of joint ownership. 204
Because Supreme Court rulings remain ambiguous on this jurisdictional question, and have failed to address it in the context of copyright, the federal interest in uniform, expert interpretation of the joint
authorship provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976205 compels lower
federal courts to recognize federal jurisdiction by holding that such
cases "depend[ ] on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law."206
In sum, even if courts hold that the duty to account is a state law
remedy, they should accept federal jurisdiction over copyright cases in
which one party demands an accounting based on a claim of joint authorship. Such cases implicate the federal interest in interpreting the
joint authorship provisions of the Copyright Act. Cases in which one
party demands an accounting based solely on contract rights do not
implicate this federal interest. Joint authorship cases warrant federal
jurisdiction under the second prong of the Harms test - they "assert[ ] a claim requiring construction of the Act" 207 - or under the
second prong of the Franchise Tax Board test: "the plaintiff's right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law." 208
203. Joint authorship cases may be considered incorporation cases, but of an odd kind: assuming that the duty to account is a state remedy, the state is obliged to incorporate the federal
joint authorship standard. This contrasts with Merrell Dow, where the state chose to use federal
standards as a basis for negligence, rather than draft its own substantive standard of conduct.
204. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), is arguably on point. In De Sylva, the
Court decided a disputed question of partial ownership of copyright renewal terms. Although
the Court did not indicate how it had jurisdiction over the dispute, jurisdiction was presumably
based on the need to construe certain provisions of the Copyright Act - there was no diversity
of citizenship and no infringement. By not addressing jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may have
implicitly provided support for the second prong of the Harms test. T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339
F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). On the other hand, the Court is
not bound by a jurisdictional ruling in a case when jurisdiction is not raised. See WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 26, § 3562, at 26 n.24. Thus, the outcome of De Sylva, while suggestive, is not
dispositive.
205. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
206. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 U.S. at 28. One question remains unanswered: is federal jurisdiction over joint authorship questions exclusive or concurrent? The best answer is that it is
exclusive. Joint authorship disputes "arise under'' the copyright laws, which means that jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988). This statute gives jurisdiction "exclusive of the
courts of the states in •.. copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). Some believe that
jurisdiction arising from the interpretation of the copyright statute should be concurrent, however. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 88 (1968) (Tentative Draft No. 6) (commentary on § 1311(b))
(stating that De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) "may well have been considered [a case]
of concurrent jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331."). See
supra note 204 for a discussion of De Sylva.
207. 339 F.2d at 828.
208. 463 U.S. at 28.
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The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

The federal courts are bound not only by the jurisdiction statutes,
but also by the well-pleaded complaint rule. 209 The Supreme Court in
Franchise Tax Board recently reaffirmed the rule: jurisdiction " 'must
be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything
alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the
defendant may interpose.' " 210 Satisfying one of the two prongs of the
Franchise Tax Board test211 is necessary but not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the federal courts. The well-pleaded complaint rule thus
excludes from federal court some suits that pass the Franchise Tax
Board test. 212 The Court considers itself obliged to uphold the wellpleaded complaint rule, "for reasons involving perhaps more history
than logic,"213 even when it "produce[s] awkward results." 214
The well-pleaded complaint rule does not bar federal jurisdiction if
the accounting rule is one of federal law. The plaintiff's complaint
will necessarily contain a request for relief in the form of an accounting. With a federal element necessarily present in the complaint, the
rule is satisfied. If the accounting rule is a state remedy, however, the
well-pleaded complaint rule has the potential of leading to what the
Court calls "awkward results." Even if the remedy is based on state
law, the well-pleaded complaint rule appears to be satisfied if the
plaintiff alleges joint authorship, because a federal issue appears in the
complaint. 215 But problems may arise when a complaint contains is209. The well-pleaded complaint rule, a judicially created doctrine, is usually traced back to
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Over time, the rule has taken on a quasiconstitutional status, although it is often criticized for arbitrarily restricting federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Wei/Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 597 (1987). The rule applies to actions under the copyright jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338 (1988), as well as federal question jurisdiction. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-10 (1988) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule to a patent case under
§ 1338); Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (well-pleaded complaint rule applied to a copyright case under § 1338).
210. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)
(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
211. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
212. Franchise Tax Board itself serves as an example. The plaintiff California Franchise Tax
Board filed suit in California court over the defendant's failure to pay certain tax levies required
by California law. The defendant removed the case to federal court on the ground that its activities were covered by a federal law (BRISA), which preempts California state law. 463 U.S. at 37. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the defense of preemption was the only question
truly at issue. But it denied federal jurisdiction for one of plaintiff's causes of action because the
preemption was a defense and thus was not a necessary element of the complaint - "a straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule." 463 U.S. at 13.
213. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4.
214. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12.
215. Defendant may argue that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not satisfied because plaintiff's claim of joint authorship is not necessary to frame the complaint: plaintiff would still have
an action in state court without the allegation of joint authorship. But the allegation of joint
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sues of both contract and joint authorship. 216 At this preliminary
stage of the litigation, the court will have difficulty piercing the pleadings to find out whether the question of joint authorship is truly at
issue. The court may be tempted to consider such a suit to be based on
state law and deny jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint
rule.211
Construing the well-pleaded complaint rule to exclude such combination contract/joint author cases from federal jurisdiction would be
unwise. The rights of joint authors are based on federal statute and
federal judicial interpretation. After Reid, 218 these rights are in a state
of flux and should be determined by federal courts, where uniformity
can better be enforced. 219 Joint authors' rights fall within the
Franchise Tax Board test, requiring "resolution of a substantial question of federal law,"220 and they should not be excluded by the wellpleaded complaint rule.
The well-pleaded complaint rule may also be an obstacle to suits in
which sole and joint authorship are pleaded in the alternative. Sole
authorship cases involve infringement and are federal matters. 221 If
courts consider the duty to account in joint authorship cases to be a
state remedy, and if courts further rule that joint authorship claims
fail the Harms test, the well-pleaded complaint rule may bar federal
jurisdiction: "a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless [federal]
law is essential to each of those theories." 222
A solution to these difficulties is attainable. Courts should hold
that a plaintiff's bare allegation of joint authorship in the complaint is
sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction.223 Unfortunately, federal
authorship is necessary to show that the complaint is of the type that federal courts should hear.
This should be a sufficient showing of necessity to pass the well-pleaded complaint rule.
216. See, e.g., Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Newman v. Crowell, 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases both involved plaintiffs who claimed joint
authorship in a work and a breach of contract regarding the assignment or licensing of the work.
See supra note 79.
.
217. Both Newman and Keith were dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. See supra note
79. The courts did not reach the well-pleaded complaint issue, however, deciding the cases instead on the ground that the actions did not arise under the copyright laws.
218. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
219. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
220. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13.
221. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
222. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988). This is a patent
law case, but since the same jurisdiction statute applies (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)), the result
should be the same.
223. Examples of cases in which the well-pleaded complaint rule did not bar federal jurisdiction are Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987), and Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky,
535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The courts, however, did not discuss the applicability of the
well-pleaded complaint rule in the opinions.
The courts should require the plaintiff to allege that he is a joint author, not that he obtained
title from an earlier joint author. Joint authorship questions could conceivably arise even in the
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courts may get a number of cases in which plaintiffs plead joint authorship merely to qualify for federal jurisdiction. The court may
hope to deter many such cases by quick dismissal or by sanctions.224
Even if a number of frivolous cases remain, however, federal courts
should initially take jurisdiction. To do otherwise would be to eliminate this class of actions from the federal court system, since under the
well-pleaded complaint rule, courts must determine jurisdiction initially by looking at the face of the complaint alone. 22s
Courts in similar circumstances have shown a willingness to construe the well-pleaded complaint rule liberally to avoid injustice to the
parties and to give the plaintiff his choice of forum. For example, a
plaintiff in his pleadings often presents a dispute over an assignment or
a license of a copyright as a federal infringement action as follows: the
plaintiff rescinds the contract and then sues for infringement, asserting
that the defendant is copying the work without permission. Some
courts have held that such complaints satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, even though the actions can also be characterized as state
contract disputes. 226 If the infringement claim has no real merit (that
is, if the assignment was in fact valid), the court may later dismiss the
action in a motion for summary judgment227 or dismiss at the court's
discretion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.22s
Courts should follow the same procedure in joint authorship accounting cases. If the plaintiff alleges he is a joint author on the face
of his complaint, the court should deem the complaint to satisfy the
well-pleaded complaint rule. If the defendant in his answer demonstrates that joint authorship will not be an issue - for example, if the
defendant admits to joint authorship and disputes only facts that raise
contract issues - the court may immediately dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action229 or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 230 If the court determines later that the joint authorship claim
has no merit, and that the suit is predominantly a contract dispute, the
court should dismiss the suit without prejudice in a motion for summary judgment, giving the plaintiff an opportunity to bring the claim
latter case. But the probability of such questions' arising diminishes the further the plaintiff is
removed from joint authorship. This rule, like the well-pleaded complaint rule itself, is a way of
allowing federal courts to make a rough cut at the pleading stage when the likelihood that federal
issues will arise is low.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 229-32.
225. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
226. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing plaintiff to
rescind licensing agreement and sue defendant for copyright infringement in federal court).
227. See, e.g., Malinowski v. Playboy Enters., 706 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dismissing
plaintiff's claim for infringement on motion for summary judgment when court learned that a
contract dispute was the only issue).
228. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(l).
229. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6).
230. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(l).

June 1992]

Note -

Duty To Account

2033

in the appropriate state court. If the claim for federal jurisdiction was
frivolous or abusive, Rule 11 sanctions may be appropriate. 231 Such
sanctions would be a powerful deterrent to litigants who would use
this liberal interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule to assert
federal jurisdiction improperly.232
CONCLUSION

A joint owner of a copyright is under a duty to account to other
owners for their share of any profits realized by the exploitation of the
work. This Note supports the position that the duty to account is a
federal remedy. It is a creation of federal common law, fashioned by
the federal courts to fill gaps in the statutory language of the Copyright Act of 1909, using common law tenancy-in-common as a model.
As a federal remedy, the duty to account promotes national uniformity and expert adjudication of rights of copyright owners, much like
the statutory remedy of infringement. As a federal common law remedy, the duty to account "arises under" the copyright laws of the
United States, just as the statutory remedy of infringement "arises
under" those laws. Thus, a complaint asking for an accounting should
be given exclusive federal jurisdiction. The federal interest in national
uniformity of remedy outweighs the state interest in adjudicating contract issues arising in disputes involving coowners of copyrights.
Even if the courts reject the preceding analysis and hold that the
accounting remedy is a creation of state law, the federal courts should
have jurisdiction over at least a portion of the copyright accounting
cases. Copyright accounting cases can be divided into two classes:
231. FED. R. Clv. P. 11.
232. A problem may arise if the plaintiff wishes to try a joint authorship case in state court,
but the defendant wishes to remove to federal court. Suppose the plaintiff serves a complaint in
state court, in which he merely recites the allegation that he is coowner of the copyright without
alleging joint ownership. The defendant may want to raise the defense that the plaintiff is not a
coowner because he is not a joint author. Should the defendant be allowed to remove the case to
federal court? Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988), the defendant may remove a case to federal
court if the plaintiff could have brought the case in federal court originally. At first glance, the
answer appears to be no: the defendant seems to run afoul of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
because the federal element of the claim arises in a defense. But such a defendant may still get
federal jurisdiction if the court holds that the allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of
the complaint. That is, the plaintiff, as part of a well-pleaded complaint, must specify whether he
intends to rely on joint authorship for his claim of ownership of the copyright. "[A] plaintiff may
not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
Similarly, a plaintiff who wishes to deny that defendant is a joint author of a work should be
able to get a declaratory judgment in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). The underlying coercive action - the defendant's suing the plaintiff for an accounting - will satisfy the wellpleaded complaint rule if an allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of the complaint.
See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at
16 ("Skelly Oil has come to stand for the proposition that 'if, but for the availability of the
declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created
action, jurisdiction is lacking.'") (quoting lOA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2767, at 74445).
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contract cases, in which coownership of the copyright came about by
assignment of the copyright; and joint authorship cases, in which
coownership came about from joint contributions to the creation of
the work by the coowners. Federal interests are implicated to different
degrees in these two classes of disputes. Claims for a declaration of
joint authorship and an accounting should be given federal jurisdiction. Such claims "arise under" the copyright laws because they require the application and interpretation of the joint authorship
provisions of the copyright statute. These provisions are particularly
unsettled after Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, and they
require federal interpretation. Contract claims, on the other hand, are
at base state law claims, and the concomitant demand for an accounting does not change them into claims that "arise under" the copyright
laws, unless the accounting remedy is itself considered federal.
Copyright owners want predictable application of the laws and a
certain choice of forum. The judiciary, on the other hand, must also
concern itself with maintaining a proper balance between the federal
and state court systems. The position outlined in this Note - that the
duty to account should be considered a federal remedy, and that copyright accounting actions should be tried in federal court - provides
the best balance of these competing interests. It provides copyright
owners the predictability they need while infringing only marginally
on the interests of the states.

